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REAL PROPERTY-WATER RIGHTS-LIABILITY FOR DISCHARGE OF SURFACE 
WATER-In 1950 the corporate defendants purchased a forty acre tract of 
farm land lying north of plaintiffs' golf course and restaurant. Drainage 
from this tract had always flowed in a natural course southerly through 
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plaintiffs' land. The defendant corporations constructed a subdivision of 
169 homes on the tract. This change aggravated the discharge of surface 
water onto the land of the plaintiffs, increasing the run-off some 350 per-
cent and, in times of heavy rains, producing flood conditions. Plaintiffs 
were awarded damages and an injunction by the trial court. On appeal, 
held, reversed. In respect to 30 acres of defendants' land,1 since the in-
creased discharge was the result of improvements to the land and was 
drained to substantially the same locality as before the improvements were 
made, although by artificial means and in greater volume and force, plain-
tiffs were not entitled to relief. Yonadi v. Homestead Country Homes, Inc., 
35 N.J. Super. 514, 114 A. (2d) 564 (1955). 
Three different rules form the basis for the law of surface waters in 
the United States.2 The oldest is the civil law rule. Its fundamental prin-
ciple is that each landowner has a right to insist upon the natural fl.ow 
of surface water and a correlative duty to refrain from doing anything 
to disrupt that natural fl.ow.3 The second rule is the so-called "common 
enemy" or common law rule. The gist of this doctrine is that one may do 
with surface waters as he sees fit, retaining or repelling them at will.4 The 
third rule, that of reasonable use, is based on considerably less explicit 
authority. According to this theory, each landowner may make reasonable 
use of his land, although in the process the retention or repulsion of sur-
face water may harmfully affect other landowners.5 The principal case 
illustrates that, however different these three rules may be in theory, 
they are not nearly so far apart in practice.6 For New Jersey is a "common 
enemy" state, and yet this court reaches a result which is in substantial 
agreement with that of most courts which have met the problem, whether 
they follow the civil law, "common enemy," or reasonable use rules.7 All 
l The proof was unclear as to whether or not drainage from the remaining ten 
acres flowed to substantially the same locality as before the improvements were made. 
These questions were therefore left for determination by the trial court on remand. 
2 See Kinyon and McClure, "Interference With Surface Waters," 24 MINN. L. REV. 891 
(1940), for the most comprehensive study of this field to date. 
3 The leading cases are Orleans Navigation Co. v. Mayor of New Orleans, 2 Martin 
(La.) 269 (1811) and Martin v. Riddle, 26 Pa. 415 (1856). See 3 FARNHAM, WATERS AND 
WATER RIGHTS §889a (1904). 
4 See Kinyon and McClure, "Interference With Surface Waters," 24 MINN. L. REV. 
891 at 898 (1940). Gannon v. Hargadon, IO Allen (Mass.) 106 (1865) is the leading case. 
5 Franklin v. Drugee, 71 N.H. 186, 51 A. 911 (1901), Kinyon and McClure, "Interference 
With Surface Waters," 24 l\{INN. L. REv. 891 at 904 (1940). To date only two states, New 
Hampshire and Minnesota, can be said to have accepted this rule unqualifiedly. Bassett v. 
Salisburg Mfg. Co., 43 N.H. 569 (1862); Swett v. Cutts, 50 N.H. 439 (1870); Sheehan v. 
Flynn, 59 Minn. 436, 61 N.W. 462 (1894). 
6 For cases. decided under all three rules, yet reaching the same result, see 28 A.L.R. 
1262 (1924). 
7 The court in the principal case (at 519) begins with the basic "common enemy" 
premise, modified by an interesting exception. "Under this exception, a defendant 
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these courts have discovered that, although a simple maxim possesses the 
undeniable virtue of certainty, it is unworkable when applied to the com-
plex realities of infinitely varied fact situations. Those states which have 
adopted a reasonable use approach have met the problem by adopting a 
rule as fluid as the subject matter it governs. The majority of states have 
achieved the same results, while nominally adhering to "common enemy" 
or civil law theories, by adopting exceptions to these basic theories and 
phrasing the exceptions in reasonable use terminology.8 The principal 
case rejected the application of any such exceptions in the particular situa-
tion with which it was concerned. However, in light of the history of the 
"common enemy" rule in New Jersey and other jurisdictions, it is very 
doubtful if this or any court would apply the rule to its logical conclusion 
in the face of material or substantial damage due to unreasonable use ·of 
the defendant's land. Despite the concern of courts for legal certainty, the 
facts have usually controlled the law, as in the principal case, and most 
courts have tacitly rejected the inflexible approach, some apparently with-
out realizing i!,- Consequently, vacillation between one doctrine and an-
other has created confusion as to just what the rule really is.9 Obviously, 
the law would be put on a much more stable basis by an outright adoption 
of a reasonable use theory, in name as well as in form. In view of the 
spreading acceptance of such a theory by legal authors10 and the Restate-
renders himself absolutely liable if by means of such an artificial device he causes 
surface water to be carried in a body large enough to do substantial injury . • . and 
thereby casts it on plaintiff's lands away from where it otherwise would have flowed." 
(Emphasis added.) The court speaks of absolutes, yet leaves itself a safety valve for 
hard cases in the word "substantial." It is evident that strict adherence to these absolutes 
would produce ridiculous results. In such extremes the court might find escape in 
other New Jersey cases. At least two have been decided specifically on the reasonable 
use theory. Smith v. Orben, 119 N.J. Eq. 291, 182 A. 153 (1935); Brownsey v. General 
Printing Ink Corp., 118 N.J.L. 505, 193 A. 824 (1937). Others have been decided through 
a determination that the damage was substantial or material, or that the injury arose 
from the "legitimate beneficial use" of the property. Hughes v. Knight, 33 N.J. Super. 
519, 111 A. (2d) 69 (1955); Jessup v. Bamford Bros. Silk Mfg. Co., 66 N.J.L. 641, 51 A. 
147 (1901). . 
.S E.g.: the original civil law jurisdiction of Louisiana used a "necessary and useful" 
test in Martin v. Jett, 12 La. 501 (1836); Pennsylvania, a leading "common enemy" state, 
has decided cases on a determination of what is necessary, material, or "not unreason-
able" from at least 1892 up to 1955. Meixell v. Morgan, 149 Pa. 415, 24 A. 216 (1892); 
Leiper v. Heywood-Hall Construction Co., 381 Pa. 317, 113 A. (2d) 148 (1955). See also 
Kinyon and McClure, "Interference With Surface Waters," 24 MINN. L. R.Ev. 891 at 916 
(1940). 
9 The civil law jurisdiction of Maryland swung quite• close to the adoption of a 
reasonable use theory in Whitman v. Forney, 181 Md. 652, 31 A. (2d) 630 (1943), then 
swung back again in Biberman v. Funkhouser, 190 Md. 424, 58 A. (2d) 668 (1948), even 
citing the Whitman case as civil law authority. If there is any distinction to be made 
between these cases, it seems to be only in the degree of injury, which is itself a deter-
mination on a reasonableness basis. 
10 Kinyon and McClure, "Interference With Surface Waters," 24 MINN. L. R.Ev. 891 
(1940); Brown, "The Golden Rule as a Maxim of the Modem La.w of Water Rights," 
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ment of Torts,11 the dilution of the "common enemy" and civil law prin-
ciples by the courts is evidence of a gradual shift of judicial approval to 
such an approach. 
Robert E. Hammell 
56 AM. L REv. 401 (1922); 15 BoST. UNIV. L. REv. 892 (1935); Worthington, "Waters: 
Surface Water Drainage," 2 UNIV. FLA. L. REv. 392 (1949). 
11 4 TORTS RESTATEMENT §833 (1939). 
